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RECENT DECISIONS
Antitrust Law-BAR ASSOCIATIONS' MnMUM FEE SCHEDULES HELD NOT TO
VIOLATE THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST AcT-Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497
F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
The Sherman Antitrust Act' attempted to eliminate all price fixing and
to establish free competition as the cornerstone of this nation's economic
policy.2 Nevertheless, Congress soon excluded farm and labor organiza-
tions from the Act's operation,3 and judicially created exclusions were
established, such as the state action exemption' and the learned profession
exemption.' Today antitrust exemptions are numerous6 and involve a con-
siderable portion of the economy.
7
Price fixing, in the form of bar association minimum fee schedules, dates
1. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1970).
2. In United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927), Justice Stone stated:
"[W]hatever difference of opinion there may be ... it cannot be doubted that the Sherman
Law and judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public
interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of
competition." Id. at 397.
3. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44; 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52-53 (1970).
4. The state action exemption originated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where
the Supreme Court held that a state was not a person within the meaing of the Act. "We
find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legisla-
ture." Id. at 350-51. See Bachelder, State-Approved Transactions, 33 A.B.A. ANTTRUST L.
PROCEEDINGS 99 (1967).
5. The learned profession exemption excludes certain professions, such as law and medi-
cine, from the purview of the Sherman Act because the practice of these professions is not
trade or commerce within the Act's meaning. The major impetus for this exemption comes
from Justice Story's definition of trade: "[T]he word 'trade' is often and, indeed, generally
used in a broader sense, as equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether
manual or mercantile. Whenever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for
the purpose of profit or gain, or livelihood, not in the liberal arts or learned professions, it is
constantly called a trade." The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C. Me.
1834). Justice Sutherland quoted this as authoritative during his discussion of "restraint of
trade" under § 3 of the Sherman Act in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S.
427, 436 (1932). See Coleman, Learned Professions, 33 A.B.A. ANTTRusT L. PROCEEDInGS 48
(1967).
6. For a list of exemptions to the Sherman Act see Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions
from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. PROCEEDINGS 313, 330 (1961). See also Orrick, The
Recent Erosion of Certain Antitrust Exemptions, 10 ANTITRUST BuLL. 667 (1965).
7. Some commentators have estimated that close to 20% of the economy is exempt from
the Sherman Act. See Pogue, note 6 supra at 314 & n.5.
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back to 1795.8 Despite their history and current widespread use,' such
schedules have been the subject of considerable controversy."
The recent case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar" renewed this contro-
versy when the minimum fee schedules of the Fairfax County Bar Associa-
tion and the Virginia State Bar were assailed as violative of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.' 2 Unable to find an attorney to perform a title examination
for less than the amount suggested in the Fairfax County Bar Association
Minimum Fee Schedule, 3 the Goldfarbs brought an action against the
Virginia State Bar and the Fairfax County Bar Association," alleging that
these organizations had "conspired to restrain interstate commerce
through the use of fixed fees."' 5 Applying the state action exemption, the
8. A 1795 resolution of the Providence County, Rhode Island, Bar Association stated:
"[N]o member shall give any opinion or advice upon any law question for a less sum than
$1.00." This historical note is found in Maxwell, Bar Association Minimum Fee Bills: Their
Impact Upon C.L.L.A. Practices, 71 CoM. L.J. 278 (1966).
9. At the present, minimum fee schedules are employed by approximately 30 state and
600 local bar associations. See Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules v. Antitrust: The Goldfarb
Affair, 45 Miss. L.J. 162 (1974). For a note as to the effect of the district court's decision upon
the use of minimum fee schedules see id. at n.2.
10. Opponents of minimum fee schedules feel that such schedules maintain the cost of legal
services at an artifically high level. They contend that these artificial rates effectively de-
prive those in the working class of legal counsel because they are not wealthy enough to afford
the rates nor poor enough to qualify for legal aid. They also assert that the schedules allow
for overcompensation of inexperienced or incompetent attorneys.
Those who support minimum fee schedules argue that their abolishment would open the
door to undesirable competition among attorneys. They feel that without schedules, unscru-
pulous lawyers would attract clients by charging extremely low fees. Then price rather than
confidence in, or the qualifications would become the main consideration in choosing an
attorney, and this would debase the entire profession.
See Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655 (1971); Ferren
& Snyder, Antitrust & Ethical Aspects of Lawyers' Minimum Fee Schedules, 7 REAL PRop.,
PROBATE & TRUST J. 726 (1972); Morgan, Where Do We Go From Here with Minimum Fee
Schedules? 59 A.B.A.J. 1403 (1973).
11. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
12. Id. at 3-4. Such an attack upon minimum fee schedules was not unexpected. The
Justice Department has been investigating bar association fee schedules, see 48 NOTE DAME
LAWYER 966 (1973), and there have been warnings of such action from within the profession.
See Morgan, note 8 supra.
13. The mortgagee required the Goldfarbs to get title insurance which necessitated a title
search by a Virginia attorney. 497 F.2d at 3. The title examination fee involved was "1%
of the first $50,000 of the purchase price plus 1/2% of all over $50,000." Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 493 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1973).
14. The Arlington County Bar Association and the Alexandria Bar Association were origi-
nally named as codefendants, but they cancelled their fee schedules and agreed to a consent
judgment. 355 F. Supp. at 492 n.1.
15. 497 F.2d at 4.
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district court held for the State Bar," but against the County Association,17
finding its schedule to.have a direct and substantial effect upon interstate
commerce.'" The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's finding with respect to the State Bar,'" but reversed with
respect to the County Association, 20 placing it under the learned profession
exemption2' and finding no direct or substantial effect of its schedule on
interstate commerce.2
Although courts have generally not found concrete standards in the state
action exemption 2 as it first appeared in Parker v. Brown,u the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has developed three requirements which a pro-
gram must meet to successfully claim the exemption." To qualify, a pro-
gram must be: (1) instituted pursuant to authority vested by legislation;
(2) initiated primarily for the public benefit; and (3) sufficiently super-
vised by the state.2 1
Applying these criteria, the fourth circuit found that since the State Bar,
which promulgated a minimum fee schedule as part of its Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility,2 was created by the Virginia General Assembly to
16. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
17. Id. at 496.
18. Id. at 494.
19. 497 F.2d at 20.
20. Id.
21. The court held that the practice of law is not trade or commerce, and therefore, the
County Association qualified for the exemption. "Restraints upon the practice of law are not
illegal per se because that which is restrained (i.e., the practice of a 'learned profession') is
neither trade nor commerce." Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 18.
23. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Woods Explora-
tion & Producing Co. v. Aluminium Co. of America, 284 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968). See
also Poch, State Action Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 50 BOSTON U. L. Rxv. 393 (1970).
24. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Supreme Court held that the price fixing involved in a
California program instituted to stabilize the price of raisins sold within the state did not
violate the Sherman Act because a state is not a person within the meaning of the Act. Id.
at 350-51.
25. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971) (holding that Virginia's regulation scheme for public utilities qualified for the state
action exemption); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding that a
North Carolina automobile rating bureau qualified for the state action exemption); Asheville
Tdbacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959) (holding that the legislative
approval of a pre-existing warehouse regulation scheme did not qualify for the state action
exemption).
26. 497 F.2d at 6.
27. The State Bar promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility under the
auspices of the Virginia Superme Court pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48(b) (Rpl. Vol.
1975]
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assist the Virginia Supreme Court in regulating the practice of law, 2 it
satisfied the requirement of legislative authority.0 Examining the lan-
guage of the Code of Professional Responsibility,0 the court concluded that
its "primary functions are to protect rights and interests of clients and to
instill public confidence in the legal profession and our system of justice."' 3'
Through this finding the requirement of being primarily for the public
benefit was fulfilled.3
2
1972). This Code is based upon nine .Canons which are "statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers." There
are advisory Ethical Considerations and mandatory Disciplinary Rules under each Canon.
DR 2-106 of the Code refers to the "Minimum or customary fee charged in the locality." 497
F.2d at 9-10.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (Repl. Vol. 1972) provides:
The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate
and amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys at
law....
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending and disbarring attorneys at
law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides:
The Supreme Court of Appeals may... prescribe. . . rules and regulations organizing
and governing the association known as the Virginia State Bar . . . to act as an
administrative agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting the
violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted by the Court under this arti-
cle. . . and requiring all persons practicing law in this State to be members thereof in
good standing.
29. The court found the requirement of legislative authority was fulfilled by the fact that
the State Bar was created by the legislature in VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (Cum. Supp. 1973),
and the Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. §
54-48(b) (Repl. Vol. 1972). 497 F.2d at 12.
30. The court's conclusion that the Code of Professional Responsibility was instituted for
the benefit of the public was based principally upon a reading of the nine Canons which form
the basis of the Code. They are:
(1) A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession.
(2) A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal
counsel available.
(3) A lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law.
(4) A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.
(5) A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client.
(6) A lawyer should represent a client completely.
(7) A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.
(8) A lawyer should assist in improving the legal system.
(9) A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.
Va. Code of Professional Responsibility quoted in 497 F.2d at 9-10.
31. 497 F.2d at 9.
32. The court reasoned that the fact that attorneys may receive some benefit from the Code
of Professional Responsibility did not negate the obvious public benefit of the Code. Id. at 9-
10.
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The fourth circuit had previously held" that a program administered by
a body of regulated individuals could satisfy the final requirement of suffi-
cient state supervision if actively supervised by an independent state
agency or official." Therefore, in considering whether the State Bar met
this requirement, the court had to determine whether the State Bar, which
is staffed by licensed attorneys," was actively supervised by the Virginia
Supreme Court. Following another previous holding3 that administrative
silence cannot be construed as a failure to supervise, 7 the court found
sufficient state supervision despite the Virginia Supreme Court's silence
concerning the State Bar's minimum fee schedule." Thus, the court con-
cluded that the State Bar's minimum fee schedule qualified for the state
action exemption."
Although the court held that the state action exemption did apply to the
State Bar, it determined that the County Association, a private agency not
subject to direct supervision by the Virginia Supreme Court," could not
qualify because it did not meet the requirements of legislative authority
or state supervision." The majority, however, found that the County Asso-
33. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. F.T.C., 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). The court
declined to apply the state action exemption to the legislative approval of a pre-existing
regulatory scheme for tobacco warehouses.
34. "When a state has a public policy against free competition in an industry important
to it, the state may regulate that industry in order to ... eliminate competition. It may even
permit persons subject to such control to participate in the regulation provided their activities
are adequately supervised by independent state officials." Id. at 509.
35. 497 F.2d at 8-9.
36. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
The court applied the state action exemption to the regulation of public utilities by the
Virginia State Corpcradiun Commission.
37. "[B]ut the conclusion is not inevitable unless one equates administrative silence with
abandonment of administrative duty. It is just as sensible to infer that silence means consent,
i.e. approval." Id. at 252.
38. The court found that the Virginia Supreme Court's silence did not indicate a lack of
supervision or approval. In fact, the court found an indication of the Virginia Supreme Court's
active approval and supervision of the State Bar's minimum fee schedule in two facts: (1)
the Virginia Supreme Court specifically authorized the State Bar to issue minimum fee
schedules; (2) and the Virginia Supreme Court has given the State Bar the authority to issue
official opinions and reports dealing with minimum fee schedules. 497 F.2d at 9.
39. Id. at 8-12.
40. The court held that since the County Association was a voluntary organization and the
state had no control over it, the County Association could not meet the adequate state
supervision requirement. Id. at 12.
41. The court also rejected the County Association's argument that it met the legislative
authority requirement for the state action exemption because it had published its "Minimum
Fee Schedule" in compliance with the State Bar's "Minimum Fee Schedule Report," and in
reliance upon State Bar Opinions 98 and 170. The State Bar's "Minimum Fee Schedule
19751
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ciation did come under the learned profession exemption, 2 which is based
on the proposition that "personal effort, not related to production" is not
a trade. 3 It is worthwhile to note that the Supreme Court has never specifi-
cally commented upon the validity of this exemption44 and has only sug-
gested that doctors and lawyers "follow a profession and not a trade."'45 The
court further reasoned that the practice of law was validly exempted from
the Sherman Antitrust Act because competitiof of the sort which the Act
was created to preserve came into direct conflict with ethical considera-
tions of the profession;46 however, the court noted that the exemption was
limited to the professional activities of attorneys. 7
Even though the practice of law involved in Goldfarb was carried on
entirely within Virginia,48 and the fourth circuit held that the learned
profession exemption applied, the County Association's fee schedule would
still violate the Sherman Antitrust Act if it had a direct and substantial
Report" urged local bar associations to issue minimum fee schedules, and the State Bar
Opinions 98 and 170 threatened disciplinary action against any attorney failing to comply
with such schedules. Id. at 12-13.
42. Id. at 14-15. Contra, 497 F.2d 20, 23 (dissenting opinion); 355 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D.
Va. 1973).
43. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 209 (1922) (dictum).
44. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Brokers, 399 U.S. 485 (1950). In
discussing the meaning of "trade," the court stated: "We do not intimate an opinion on the
correctness of the application of the term trade to the professions." Id. at 491-92. Accord,
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
45. F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (dictum).
46. The court in Goldfarb reasoned that the legal profession should be exempted from the
purview of the Sherman Act because "[aidvertising and other forms of solicitation of busi-
ness common to trade and commerce are criminal acts when utilized by lawyers. In view of
the special form of regulation already imposed upon those in the legal profession the courts
have been reluctant to superimpose upon the profession the sanctions of the antitrust laws,
many of which are in direct contravention of existing legal and ethical restrictions." 497 F.2d
at 14. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343
U.S. 326 (1952), a similar consideration with respect to the medical profession:
We might observe in passing, however, that there are ethical considerations where
the historic, direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are
quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial mat-
ters. This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world
may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession. Id. at 336.
47. "The 'learned profession' exemption is a defense to a Sherman Act violation only where
the restraint is upon the learned profession itself. That exemption is applicable only to those
matters with respect to which an accord must be reached between the necessities of profes-
sional regulation and the dictates of the antitrust laws." 497 F.2d at 15. Accord, Northern
Calif. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. Utah 1962).
48. 497 F.2d at 16.
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effect on interstate commerce." The fourth circuit, after examining the
factors of considerable out-of-state financing, the many homeowners work-
ing out of state, and a significant number of federally guaranteed loans, 50
found that these connections between the schedule and interstate com-
merce were merely incidental."' The court held that the most important
factor was the essential intrastate nature of the practice of law and that
these connections did not constitute a direct and substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
52
As the most recent opinion of the fourth circuit analyzing the state
action exemption, Goldfarb refined and sharpened the criteria used in
applying this exemption. It is also significant because the fourth circuit
became one of only three circuits which have recognized the learned profes-
sion exemption," and its justification is well reasoned and convincing.
Although the court's upholding of minimum fee schedules surprised many
observers,5 it is hard to say how Goldfarb will fare upon appeal. The
outcome depends upon whether the Supreme Court will hold the learned
profession exemption valid and whether it will find the schedule had a
direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce.5
J.G.M.
49. Id. Accord, United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); American Medical Ass'n
v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
50. The district court's finding that the County Association's "Minimum Fee Schedule"
had a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce was based upon three facts. 1) A
considerable portion of the funds used in financing homes in Fairfax County, Virginia, come
from lending agencies outside the state, and most of these agencies require title insurance.
2) A large percentage of homeowners in the county work outside the state. 3) The Veteran's
Administration and Department of Housing and Urban Development guarantee a significant
amount of the mortgages in the county. 355 F. Supp. at 494 (E.D. Va. 1973).
51. 497 F.2d at 16-18.
52. Id. at 16. Accord, Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1969); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
53. Two other circuits have explicitly recognized the learned profession exemption. See
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Riggall v. Washing-
ton County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957).
54. Many commentators believed that the district court's decision signaled the death knell
of minimum fee schedules. See Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules v. Antitrust: The
Goldfarb Affair, 45 Miss. L.J. 162 (1974); 27 Sw. L.J. 524 (1973); 48 TuL. L. REv. 682 (1974).
55. As of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, limiting the
arguments to two issues. 1) Are the minimum fee schedules of state bar associations exempt
from the antitrust laws' prohibitions on price-fixing because they restrain competition in a
"learned profession"? 2) Did the fixing of fees for title examinations on homes in Northern
Virginia constitute a substantial effect upon interstate commerce? 43 U.S.L.W. 3246 (Oct.
29, 1974) (No. 74-70). The Supreme Court has also denied the motion of the State Bar to be
dismissed as a party respondent. 43 U.S.L.W. 3279 (Nov. 12, 1974).
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